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Abstract: This paper argues that the EU’s efforts to promote private enforcement in 
competition law, lack a coherent purpose. The drive to facilitate actions for damages was 
originally a response to the underdeveloped and diverging nature of private enforcement 
rules across its Member States. Enhancing deterrence (especially through stand-alone 
actions) constituted a primary objective at first, but was later abandoned for an emphasis 
on compensating injured parties. It is argued that the 2014 Damages Directive fails on both 






The Competition Laws of the European Union (EU) have been a major influence on countless 
jurisdictions around the world, but its strength as a public enforcement regime has always 
contrasted with a perceived absence of private enforcement. Private parties cannot bring an 
action for damages or injunctive relief before EU courts. They can only make a complaint to 
the European Commission or National Competition Authority, to investigate an infringement 
of competition law, on their behalf. Therefore, a party’s ability to recover damages, falls on 
the national tort and civil liability rules of each Member State. Although most European 
legal systems can broadly be described as belonging to the Civil Law tradition, there are 
significant differences in procedure and legal culture when it comes to recovering damages. 
It is also important to remember that the EU has continued to grow in the last fifteen years, 
with the accession of ten new Member States in 2004, and a further three in 2007 and 
2013.2 These include states that have made a rapid transition from centrally planned 
economies and Communist era legal systems. 
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This paper critically analyses the European Commission’s drive to encourage private 
enforcement of competition law, focusing on the purpose of the 2014 Damages Directive.3 It 
begins by briefly identifying the objectives of private enforcement, the challenges 
associated with it (Section 2), and the characteristics of US Antitrust Law that incentivise 
private actions there (Section 3). The paper then turns its focus to Europe, where it outlines 
the situation before the Directive (Section 4) and then maps how the debate in Europe 
developed from around 2004; exploring why certain policy areas were abandoned and 
objectives moved away from enhancing deterrence (Section 5). Finally, the Directive’s 
provisions are mapped against the issues identified earlierin the paper (Section 6). The 
paper concludes by arguing that the Directive is unlikely to significantly encourage private 
actions and may even be undermining the effectiveness of public enforcement. 
 
 
2. The Challenges of Private Enforcement 
 
In principle, the private enforcement of competition law serves two useful functions: 
deterrence and compensation. The first supplements public enforcement, either through 
the recovery of damages over and beyond public fines (follow-on actions), or by 
empowering parties to uncover and challenge infringements that have not been subject to 
public enforcement (stand-alone actions). While follow-on actions essentially amount to an 
extension of the existing public penalty in the form of damages, it is stand-alone actions that 
have the greater deterrence-enhancing effect. This is because they result in the uncovering 
of infringements that might otherwise go entirely undetected.4  The second function is to 
ensure injured parties (be they other firms or final consumers) are compensated for the 
financial harm they have incurred as a result of the anti-competitive conduct, so that they 
might be restored to the situation they would have enjoyed absent the infringement.  
 
While very significant sums of money are recovered from undertakings in the form of public 
cartel fines (€26.5 billion in European Commission decisions delivered between 1990-2016), 
these are paid to Member States and so benefit the general taxpayer. None of this money is 
used to directly compensate parties affected by an infringement. Indeed, the vast majority 
of these cases are considered anti-competitive by ‘object’ under Article 101 TFEU, meaning 
that effects need not be shown. A Commission Decision in relation to a cartel will not 
typically attempt to ascertain the extent of the harm caused, or the identity of the injured 
parties. Often it also fails to establish whether the cartel arrangement was properly 
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implemented. This poses a major obstacle to prospective claimants in follow-on cases, as 
they must establish both causation and harm.  
 
The challenge of bringing an action for damages is even greater for stand-alone claimants. 
Cartels are by their very nature secretive agreements, often going to great lengths to hide 
their manipulation of the market from their customers, the authorities and even others 
within the same firm. 5 It is for this reason that around two thirds of cartels uncovered in the 
EU, are done so as a result of a cartel member self-reporting under the leniency 
programme.6 Those that are not detected through leniency, are uncovered by competition 
authorities using wide-ranging investigative powers, that include unannounced dawn raids, 
interviews with employees and powers of seizure.7 A private claimant does not enjoy 
equivalent powers, despite having a higher hurdle to overcome than the competition 
authority.  
 
A private claimant must also show that they suffered harm as a result of that conduct; 
something that is far from straightforward. There are important issues such as, whether 
indirect purchasers should be able to bring an action and, if so, whether the cartel should be 
able to use passing-on as a defence or in mitigation against a claim. There is also the 
question of harm caused to those without direct dealings with the cartel, who are not even 
indirect purchasers. One such category is buyers priced out of purchasing the product 
altogether, as a consequence of prices being artificially inflated and output restricted. 
Another is the result of so called, ‘umbrella effects’, where the cartel’s effect on the market 
price has resulted in buyers paying an artificially high price, even though they are buying 
from a seller not party to the cartel.8 
 
Perhaps the hardest part of the process is accurately estimating damages. In principle, the 
actual harm caused by a cartel involves examining the counterfactual: what would the price 
have been absent the cartel? This question can involve a considerable amount of 
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speculation, as the counterfactual price will have been affected by a number of factors. For 
example, cartels typically occur in markets experiencing crisis and can be formed to stop 
one or more firm in the industry from becoming insolvent. Therefore, the counterfactual 
price must take into account the possibility of some upward pressure on prices as a 
consequence of firms exiting the market, thereby making it more concentrated. In practice, 
courts consider economic evidence provided by each party, but the final calculation of 
damages can often be better characterised as an estimation employing a series of proxies 
and assumptions about the market 9 
 
Given these difficulties, it is worth briefly setting out why the level of private enforcement is 
so high in the United States. 
 
 
3. Private Enforcement in the United States 
 
In 2006, there were a total of 1,004 Antitrust cases filed in the United States, of which just 
37 were public enforcement and 967 were private actions for damages.10 While this year 
may represent a spike in private cases, most US scholars continue to endorse the 1983 
Georgetown Study estimate that private actions represent around 90 per cent of all US 
Antitrust cases.11 By contrast, the number of known private cases in Europe that had been 
litigated in court by 2001, could virtually be counted on both hands.12 
 
The high level of private enforcement in the US can be put down to a series of factors that, 
taken together, strongly incentivise prospective claimants to bring an action. These are: 
 
Treble Damages: Claimants in the US can recover three times the harm they suffered. This 
breaks the general rule in Tort law, that damages should be restitutionary and therefore 
reflect the actual harm caused. These pecuniary damages can be sought on top of public 
fines; essentially amounting to a form of double jeopardy, as the purpose of both is to 
deter. Treble damages strongly incentivise both claims and out of cour settlements.13 
 
Favourable Cost Rules: The normal cost rule in the US is that each party pays their own 
costs. Antitrust cases go a step further, as there is also a one-way cost rule in the Clayton 
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Act, that favours the plaintiff.14 This contrasts with the ‘loser pays’ principle that dominates 
legal systems in the rest of the world. The cost rules in the US significantly reduce the risk to 
bringing an action, by shielding the plaintiff from a significant proportion of the financial risk 
associated with being unsuccessful.15 
 
Joint and Several Liability: Any member of a cartel can be sued for the damage caused by 
the entire infringement, even if that means paying out more than their ‘share’ of liability. 
This means that plaintiffs do not necessarily have to recover damages from the cartel 
member they had dealings with. 
 
Pre-Trial Discovery Rules: US discovery rules are among the most generous in the world, in 
allowing prospective plaintiffs to access the documents they need to establish liability.16 
 
Class Actions: Law firms in the US can sue on behalf of an entire ‘class’ of prospective 
plaintiffs and bring an action on their behalf on an ‘opt-out’ basis. This means that the claim 
can seek to recover damages for plaintiffs who have not been specifically identified or 
sought to be included in the claim. Such cases are especially effective when the harm of the 
cartel is dispersed among a large number of consumers – each of whom have not incurred a 
loss of sufficient magnitude to warrant taking action. Most may not even know they have 
been the victims of anti-competitive conduct.  
 
Passing-on and Indirect Purchasers: Direct purchasers can bring actions for treble damages 
regardless of whether they passed on some or all of the overcharge to their customers. 
There is therefore no passing-on defence in US Antitrust law.17 To simplify procedures, 
indirect purchasers do not have standing, although some State Antitrust laws have been 
amended to allow indirect purchaser standing.18 
 
Taken together, these characteristics reflect how the private enforcement of US Antitrust 
Law has a clear focus on deterrence. The primary function of these actions is not to achieve 
restitution or to ensure compensation reflects the actual harm caused to injured parties. 
They stand in stark contrast to the characteristics that dominated national tort regimes in 
Europe prior to the Damages Directive.  
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 4. Private Enforcement in Europe before the Directive 
 
In 2004, the EU’s public competition law enforcement regime reached a point of maturity. 
The European Commission was enjoying considerable success in its enforcement actions 
against cartels, thanks in large part to the adoption of a leniency programme in 1996, which 
was inspired a US Department of Justice scheme.19 In the period 2000-2004, almost €3.5 
billion were collected in fines, with the figure set to more than double in the next five 
years.20 The Commission had also dispensed with the cumbersome notification system for 
agreements seeking an exemption under Article 101(3).21 These were instead dealt with 
through a series of block exemptions and by undertakings assessing for themselves whether 
a proposed arrangement could benefit from an exception under 101(3). The Modernisation 
Regulation22 allowed Article 101 TFEU to be applied by national competition authorities and 
courts in full, for the first time, and set out rules for the relationship between EU and 
national competition rules. The Regulation did not contain any specific provisions on private  
enforcement, but its preamble noted national courts’ responsibility to award damages to 
the victims of infringements.23 
 
Although the European Commission always maintained that it was not seeking to emulate 
the US system of Antitrust Law, its influence over the development of EU policy during this 
period is undeniable. As well as leniency and the eventual introduction of a settlement 
notice, attention began to focus on the apparent low levels of private enforcement. As 
mentioned in the introduction, while the European Court of Justice24 had recognised the 
right of EU citizens to claim damages for losses caused by cartels, their ability to do so in 
their own national courts varied significantly between Member States and their incentive to 
do so was significantly weaker than in the US. It is important to remember that the EU was 
also expanding at this time and many of its new members were still in the process of 
harmonising their national laws with those of the EU – for example by adopting leniency 
programmes. 
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In 2004, the Commission published the Ashurst report on conditions of claims for damages 
in Member States, in connection with breaches of EU competition rules.25 It concluded, ‘the 
picture that emerges from the present study… is one of astonishing diversity and total 
underdevelopment’, noting that only around 60 judged cases for damages were known to 
have been completed across the EU. The Commission responded to this with a Green Paper 
on Private Enforcement in 2005.26 This was followed up by a public consultation later that 
year27, a White Paper in April 200828, a Commission Staff Working Document in June 201329, 
and a proposal for a directive in that same month.30 A Directive on antitrust damages 
actions was signed into law on 26 November 2014, with the purpose of making it easier for 
EU citizens to claim damages where they were the victims of anti-competitive behaviour. 
competitive conduct.  
 
Drawing on a number of studies, we can give an overview of the rules that governed private 
enforcement within EU Member States before the Damages Directive was introduced, and 
how these differed to the US.31 The low number of cases brought in Europe mainly came 
down to the following factors: 
 
Basis for Bringing a Claim: Some Member States had specifically legislated for a right to 
bring damages in competition law, while in others there was uncertainty over the basis for 
such claims. In addition, the decisions of national competition authorities were not 
generally binding on national courts, making it difficult to bring even a follow-on action. This 
was a particular problem, given that most national rules required the claimant to establish a 
strong causal link between the alleged infringement and the loss they uncured. 
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Poor Pre-Trial Discovery: Most Member States had little or no provision for claimants 
accessing documents, beyond the court’s ability to establish factual aspects of the case once 
proceedings had commenced. Often, even these powers had no teeth to them and the 
parties responding to a claim could simply refuse. This was not helped by the fact most 
European laws strongly favour the protection of business confidentiality, over the need to 
provide civil claimants with access to relevant documents.    
 
Restitution not Deterrence: All national Tort law regimes are designed to ensure parties 
recover only the actual harm caused. Even in jurisdictions like the UK, where exemplary 
damages are allowed in principle, courts are very reluctant to award them. For example, in 
Devenish,32 the court refused to award such damages in a follow-on action, because the 
function of deterrence had already been achieved by the public fine and so pecuniary 
damages would breach the principle of ne bis in idem (double jeopardy). 
 
Passing on Defence and Indirect Purchaser: Although these issues appeared to be 
unresolved in many Member States, the commitment to actual and not pecuniary damages, 
meant that indirect purchasers did, in principle, have standing. It followed from this that a 
cartelist could invoke a passing-on defence, to argue that the claimant (the buyer) had 
passed on any overcharge to their customers. In pursuit of actual damages, courts were 
obliged to ensure there was no unjust enrichment of the claimant. 
 
Loser Pays Cost Rule: This was the standard cost rule throughout the EU and was 
considered important in discouraging unmerited claims and the use of Tort law to extort 
money from wealthy businesses who were prepared to settle out of court. 
 
Joint and Several Liability: There was a clear statutory basis for this within some Member 
States, but not others.  
 
Collective Actions: This was perhaps the weakest aspect of private enforcement in the EU. 
Most regimes had mechanisms for combining claims, but only where each individual 
claimant had initiated a claim to begin with. While there were some special procedures for 
consumer organisations to bring claims, the few collective action mechanisms that existed 
were firmly on an ‘opt-in’ basis and so there was nothing equivalent to US class actions. 
 
So in contrast to the US, private enforcement in the European Union was characterised by 
underdevelopment, a lack of harmonization between Member States and considerable 
barriers and disincentives for prospective claimants. To fully evaluate the main question in 
this paper – whether promoting private enforcement in the EU has a coherent purpose – we 
now turn to the motivation for promoting such actions. 
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5. How did policy on private enforcement evolve? 
 
The European Commission’s Green Paper, published in 2005, appeared to emphasise the 
importance of both the central functions of private enforcement, identified in the 
introduction: deterrence and restitution. It stated,  
‘The antitrust rules… are enforced both by public and private enforcement. Both 
forms are part of a common enforcement system and serve the same aims: to deter 
anti-competitive practices forbidden by damages caused by them. …Damages 
actions for infringement of antitrust law serve several purposes, namely to 
compensate those who have suffered a loss as a consequence of anti-competitive 
behaviour and to ensure the full effectiveness of the antitrust rules of the Treaty by 
discouraging anti-competitive behaviour, thus contributing significantly to the 
maintenance of effective competition in the Community (deterrence)’33 
 
Yet by the time of the of the 2008 White Paper, the primary objective had evolved into, 
‘…[ensuring], more than is the case today, that all victims of infringements of EC 
competition law have access to effective redress mechanisms so that they can be fully 
compensated for the harm they suffered.’34 
 
The deterrent effect of private enforcement was mentioned, but only to the extent that it 
was a product of improving compensatory justice. What emerged here was a shift from 
viewing public and private enforcement as jointly pursuing a common objective 
(deterrence), to their pursuing different, albeit complementary objectives.35 The dominant 
view became that Public enforcement is about deterrence and private enforcement is about 
compensation. This was reflected in the staff working papers that accompanied the policy 
documents. The one relating to the Green Paper mentioned ‘deterrence’ 18 times, going 
into some detail on how it could be enhanced by private enforcement36, while the one 
relating to the White Paper, mentioned it only in general or complementary terms.37 Indeed 
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the White Paper itself made only one direct reference to the deterrent enhancing benefits 
of private enforcement.38 
 
 
What also emerges around the time of the White Paper is a realisation of the need ‘to 
preserve strong public enforcement’, to ensure the continued success of the European 
competition authorities’ leniency programmes, which ultimately facilitate private 
enforcement in the shape of follow-on actions (around two thirds of cartels are uncovered 
by leniency). By the time of the proposed damages Directive in 2013, the objectives had 
become: 
(a)  maintain effective public enforcement, by regulating the interaction between public 
and private enforcement, and  
(b) ensure the effective exercise of the EU right to compensation.39 
As well as ensuring access to justice, these were said to increase the competitiveness of 
European markets and to remedy a source of fragmentation in the single market.40  
 
Policy in the EU was influenced by a number of factors, but the two most significant were 
the emergence of tensions between public and private enforcement and the intransigence 
of European legal systems. 
 
5.1 Public and Private Enforcement 
 
The Damages Directive had greater scope to promote follow-on rather than stand-alone 
actions, especially given the European Commission’s high level of cartel enforcement 
activity at the time. Yet, as discussed earlier in this paper, infringement decisions establish 
guilt, but they do not generally identify the amount of harm or the parties who suffered a 
loss as a result of the arrangement. Indeed, there is a significant amount of information that 
is redacted from infringement decisions on the grounds of business confidentiality. 
Consequently, the information of most use to prospective claimants is that held by the 
European Commission and national competition authorities. This includes documents 
submitted through the leniency programme.41 Yet allowing claimants to access this 
information makes leniency less attractive and risks undermining this important 
investigative tool altogether. 
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 The need to protect leniency programmes came to a head thanks to judicial developments 
during this period. National courts faced applications to force competition authorities to 
disclose leniency documents to claimants. The outcome of these legal actions caused 
considerable confusion and concern. In the case of Pfleiderer, in 2011, the Court of Justice 
of the European Union (CJEU) passed down a judgement on a preliminary reference made 
by the Amstsgericht Bonn in Germany. The CJEU recognised that allowing access could 
compromise leniency, but this could not defeat the well-established right of individuals to 
bring a claim for damages.42 It was therefore up to the national courts and tribunals to 
consider each application for access to leniency documents on a case-by-case basis, 
according to national law, and taking into account all the relevant factors in the case.  In 
January 2012, the Amtsgericht Bonn denied Pfliederer’s request for access to the 
Bundeskartellamt’s leniency documents.43  
 
It soon became clear how the Pfleiderer case-by-case approach risked resulting in significant 
inconsistency across the very different legal systems of EU Member States. The Commission 
Staff Working Paper noted how, whereas the German first instance court44 in Pfleiderer 
protected all leniency documents, a German appeal court decision45 in a different case and 
the English High Court judgement in National Grid46, only provided partial protection. This 
meant that leniency applicants had no way of knowing in advance if their submissions would 
be protected. As predictability and consistency are cornerstones of an effective leniency 
policy, this development risked deterring leniency applications.47 The problem was 
compounded by the fact information contained in leniency documents might be freely 
exchanged by EU national competition authorities under Articles 11 and 12 of Regulation 
1/2003.48  
 
These concerns were shared by many academics and practitioners who feared that, in its 
attempt to promote private enforcement, the Commission could fatally undermine the 
leniency programme that has been the source of so many uncovered cartel agreements. The 
Commission therefore decided that the Directive should protect leniency and settlement 
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statements and also that the immune firm (the first to come forward), should be protected 
from joint and several liability too. Both these decisions were difficult and divisive, with 
many arguing it went against the Directive’s main aim of facilitating access to justice,49 while 
others were concerned that not enough protection was being afforded to firms.50 
 
In the US, this same concern about the interaction between public and private enforcement, 
resulted in the Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act 2004 (ACPERA).51 
This reduces the immune firm’s liability to single damages and removes joint and several 
liability. It allows the immune firm to settle its liabilities for significantly less than would 
otherwise be the case. The US system is aided by the fact there is no finding of guilt in 
relation to the immune firm. By contrast, the immune firm in Europe is still found to have 
infringed the law and is discussed in the infringement decision. The only practical 
implication of immunity is that the firm is given a fine of zero.  
 
5.2 European Legal Systems 
 
The background documents and consultations to the Directive did spark lively debates 
about whether it was desirable to facilitate private enforcement, by moving closer to the US 
model. However, it quickly became clear that there was significant opposition to this within 
Member States and the European Parliament. The demise of an emphasis on deterrence 
reflects, in particular, the opposition to mandating pecuniary damages in competition law 
cases. Apart from floodgate arguments, it quickly became clear that multiple or punitive 
damages raised serious issues of compatibility with basic and long-standing principles in 
Tort and Constitutional Law within most Member States52, as well as aspects of established 
Community case law.53 These legal traditions are entrenched in principles of compensation 
for actual harm, which do not allow for unjust enrichment, even if it is on sound policy 
grounds, such as the need to deter anti-competitive behaviour.54 As mentioned earlier, even 
courts in common law jurisdictions like England and Wales are cautious about abandoning 
the actual harm principle. There was particularly strong lobbying from the business 
community, to exclude the availability of punitive damages and opt for a full compensation 
                                                     
49 Their main argument – that protecting leniency documents was inconsistent with the Directive’s aim of 
ensuring compensation and with the interests of transparency – is discussed in C Migani, ‘Directive 
2014/104/EU: In Search of a Balance between the Protection of Leniency Corporate Statements and an 
Effective Private Competition Law Enforcement’ (2014) Global Antitrust Review, pp. 81-111. 
50 C Kersting, ‘Removing the Tension Between Public and Private Enforcement: Disclosure and Privileges for 
Successful Leniency Applicants’ (2014) Journal of European Competition Law & Pracice 5(1), 2-5 
51 Pub. L. No. 108-237, §§ 201-214, 118 Stat. 666–67 (2004). This was passed by Congress with a sunset clause 
of 22 June 2010. In May 2010 it was extended for another ten years. 
52 See IAWP (n 40) at 71, citing Renda et al (n 82) Part II, section 1.6.2. See also E Sahin, ‘The (Infamous) 
Question of Punitive Damages in EU Competition Law’ (2016) Global Competition Litigation Review. 
53 See discussion of C-344/98, Masterfoods and HB, EU:C:2000:689 in Wils (n 35) p29. 
54 The CJEU case law established that, as a minimum, full compensation for victims that should include the loss 
suffered, including loss of profit and interest. See: Manfredi v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA [2006] ECR I-
6619at 95 and 97, as cited in Commission White Paper (n 28) at 2.5. 
approach.55 Respondents to the White Paper consultation, therefore, enthusiastically 
welcomed the policy of single damages.56 A key concern that was raised time and time again 
by a variety of stakeholders, was the seemingly ‘apocalyptic’ consequences of replicating 
the US system, in terms of encouraging unmeritorious claims and sparking a ‘litigation 
culture’.57 
 
The commitment to full compensation, meant the dye was cast for other key policy issues. 
Single damages based on a principle of actual harm meant it was necessary to ensure 
indirect purchasers had standing. In fact, it would have been odd if EU citizens had been 
deprived standing because they had no direct contractual relationship with the cartel, as 
access to justice was always a key objective of EU private enforcement (even when there 
was a stronger emphasis on deterrence), and given that the CJEU had ruled in Manfredi that 
“any individual”58 who has suffered harm must be allowed to claim damage. The more 
significant implication of full compensation, was the availability of a passing-on defence – 
something that was strongly advocated by the business community in the consultations. 
This was deemed necessary because indirect purchaser standing created the possibility of 
multiple damages, where an infringing firm is sued for the actual harm by the direct 




6. How far did the Damages Directive go? 
 
Directive 2014/104/EU on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law 
for infringements of competition law provisions of Member States and of the European 
Union, was signed into law on 26 November 2014 and had to be transposed into Member 
States’ legal systems by 27 December 2016. 59 Article 3(1) of the Directive established the 
right set out in Crehan60 and created an obligation that ‘Member States shall ensure that 
any natural or legal person who has suffered harm caused by an infringement of 
competition law is able to claim and to obtain ‘full compensation’ for that harm’.61 By virtue 
of the principles of effectiveness and equivalence set out in Article 4, this right extended to 
                                                     
55 Commission Staff Working Document 2013 (n 29) Annex 8 at 2(e). 
56 Commission Staff Working Document 2013 (n 29) at 7. 
57 See editorial: R H Lande, ‘The Proposed Damages Legislation: Don’t Believe the Critics’ (2014) Journal of 
European Competition Law & Practice 5(3), 123-4. 
58 Manfredi (n 54) at 61, as cited in Commission White Paper (n 28) at 2.1. 
59 Under EU Law, Directives require Member States to implement laws that reach the result or set of results 
set out in the Directive. They therefore require implementation, whereas regulations are directly applicable in 
all Member States. 
60 Case C-453/99, Courage Ltd v Crehan [2001] ECR I – 6297 
61 Directive 2014/104/EU on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements 
of competition law provisions of Member States and of the European Union. 
both EU and national competition law, to help address the uneven playing field for damages 
actions the EU.62  
 
The Directive contained a number of important provisions that will have helped establish a 
minimum level of harmonization across Member States and deal with the areas of 
divergence and confusion discussed earlier on. In particular, it required that: 
1. Competition authority decisions be binding on national courts and a decision of 
an authority or court in one Member State should count as at least prima facie 
evidence of an infringement, for the purposes of an action brought elsewhere in 
the EU.63 
2. Minimum limitation periods should exist that should not run until the 
infringement has ceased and the claimant could reasonably know of them.64 
3. Courts must have the power to order the disclosure of specified items of 
evidence, on the basis of facts reasonably available to the claimant. 65 
4. Co-infringers should be held jointly and severally liable for the entire harm 
caused, with the exception of the immunity recipient. 66  
5. A presumption of harm to assist with the calculation of damages – although this 
does not relate to a specific sum and so may be of limited value in practice. 67 
6. Alternative dispute mechanisms should be encouraged to reduce litigation costs 
and widen access to compensation. 68 
 
These provisions certainly mark significant progress, but the Directive did not tackle some of 
the more pressing challenges faced by claimants. The commitment to actual damages 
means the incentive to bring an action remains weaker than in the US. The availability of a 
passing-on defence is also problematic, as it reduces the inventive for direct purchasers to 
bring an action. Although this also means indirect purchasers have standing, their ability to 
successfully bring a claim is hampered by the challenges of establishing a causal link. The 
provisions of the EU Directive and how it compares to US Antitrust Law, is summarised in 
the table below 
 
Table 1 – The EU Damages Directive 
 






Full Single Treble 
                                                     
62 See Damages Directive, recitals 8 and 10-11 and Commission Staff Working Document 2013 (n 29) at 49-55. 
63 Damages Directive, Article 9. 
64 Damages Directive, Article 10. 
65 Damages Directive, Article 5. 
66 Damages Directive, Article 11. 
67 Damages Directive, Article 17. 




Disclosure of specified categories, based 
on fact-pleading, proportionality 




Standing allowed Standing not allowed 
Passing-on 
 
Defence allowed; facilitation of proof of 
pass-on in favour of indirect purchaser 
No passing on defence in Federal Antitrust 
law. 
Effect of NCA 
decisions 
 
Commission and NCA decisions binding. 













No legislative measures. ‘Opt-out’ class actions. 
Limitation period 
 
Minimum 5 years as of reasonable 
knowledge + restart. Not less than one 
year after NCA final decision. 




No legislative measures. 
Parties pay own costs + cost shifting in 




Leniency and settlement statements not 
disclosed. Liability of immune firm limited. 
Leniency (immune) firm liability limited to 
single damages and protected from joint 




7. Has the Directive furthered the aim of compensation? 
 
If the aim of the Directive ended up being primarily about compensation, then its biggest 
failure was taking no legislative measures to promote collective actions for damages. This is 
especially significant given that defendants can rely on a passing-on defence, and the fact 
the injury caused by anticompetitive behaviour becomes more and more dispersed, the 
further it is passed down supply chains. In the White Paper, representative actions brought 
by qualified entities and the introduction of opt-in collective actions, were both mooted. 
Their purpose was to address the specific concern that individual consumers and small 
businesses typically had the weakest incentive and faced the greatest barriers, to 
successfully bringing a claim.73 The effectiveness of these measures is far from clear. The 
experience in EU Member States with existing collective redress mechanisms, was that ‘opt-
                                                     
69 Brunswick Corp. v Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977). 
70 15 U.S.C. § 15b. 
71 Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004 
72 E.g. In re Air Cargo Shipping Antitrust Litigation, 931 F. Supp. 2d 458, 563 (E.D.N.Y 2013); cited by Bill Baer 
(Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, US Department of Justice), ‘Public and Private Antitrust 
Enforcement in the United States’ Speech to European Competition Forum. Brussels, Belgium. 11 February 
2014. 
73 White Paper (n 28) at 2.1 
in’ systems were not effective. Apart from the difficulty of funding such claims in the 
absence of contingency fees or third party funding74, the expense of identifying claimants 
has proved greater than the sum of money recovered as a result of the claims.75 
 
However, the failure of the Directive to legislate for collective actions, had nothing to do 
with the past experience of such claims within Member States. Neither was it directly down 
to the intervention of the business community (who were firmly against it). In 2011, the 
Commission seemed keen to press on with these measures, despite business opposition.76 
The measures were dropped when the European Parliament delivered a resolution on 
collective redress in February 2012, which opted for a separate EU framework dealing with 
collective redress, rather than a competition specific one.77 As a consequence, collective 
redress was omitted from the Directive and the Commission instead issued a non-binding 
Recommendation that opt-in actions should be adopted.78 This was a disappointment to 
those who had been advocating an ‘opt-out’ system.79 A 2018 report on collective redress 
recorded how “…the analysis of the legislative developments in Member States as well as 
the evidence provided demonstrate that there has been a rather limited follow-up to the 
Recommendation”.80 The Directive’s failure to legislate for such actions may, therefore, 
represent a significant missed opportunity. 
 
 
8. Concluding remarks 
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(2012) IP/A/ECON/ST/2011-19 at p36. Discussed in D Geradin, ‘Collective Redress for Antitrust Damages in the 
European Union: Is this a Reality Now?’ (2015) 22 George Mason Law Review 1079, 1055. See also: B J Rodger, 
‘The Consumer Rights Act 2015 and collective redress for competition law infringements in the UK: a class 
act?’ (2015) Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 3(2), pp. 258-286; M Murphy, ‘JJB and Which? settle football 
shirt case’ (10 January 2008) Financial Times. 
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The task of promoting the private enforcement of competition law in Europe was never 
going to be straightforward. Whilst it is easy to attack the directive, using the US Antitrust 
law as a benchmark, it was never the EU’s intention to replicate that system. Indeed, long 
standing legal traditions in both civil and common law EU jurisdictions, make that an 
unrealistic prospect. Given the level of underdevelopment and inconsistency between 
Member States, the Directive has been very significant in seeking to create a minimum 
framework for private enforcement. Its consequence is that consumers in every Member 
State should, in principle at least, be able to bring an action for damages and secure 
compensation for any loss incurred as a result of an infringement of EU or national 
competition law.  
 
Yet it is hard to see how the Directive has significantly forwarded deterrence or the 
compensation objective that it ended up being focused on. The obstacles to bringing an 
action in Europe remain substantial and the incentives weak. European rules on cost, 
discovery and passing-on, make the challenges of bringing a stand-alone action against a 
cartel almost insurmountable.81 European legal systems still heavily favour the defendant 
and any continued growth in private actions is likely to be confined to large buyers affected 
by cartels, who may have passed-on much of the harm.82 Indeed, the only parties who have 
no way of passing on the harm – the final consumers and smaller businesses – are left with 
no effective mechanism for recovering damages. Without effectively addressing the position 
of these most vulnerable of claimants, it is hard to characterise the Directive as a success. 
Ironically, in attempting to address divergence in rules across Member States, the Directive 
appears to have sparked greater innovation within some. While most appear to be adhering 
to the minimum set out in the Directive, others are adopting measures that go a lot further 
– especially in relation to collective actions. For example, the Belgian Collective Redress Act 
2015, allows a judge to decide whether a collective action should be brought on an opt-in or 
opt-out basis. Meanwhile, the UK Consumer Rights Act 2015, allows the Competition 
Appeals Tribunal to allow collective proceedings on an opt-out basis.83 
 
Apart from the danger that the Directive neither significantly promotes deterrence, or 
ensures that compensation is secured by anyone other than large businesses, there is also a 
danger that the Directive has not gone far enough to protect public enforcement. In 
contrast to the strong protections that exist in the US, even a firm receiving immunity under 
                                                     
81 On cost rules, see: S Peyer, ‘The Antitrust Damages Directive – Much Ado About Nothing?’ in R Cisotta an 
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the Commission’s leniency programmes, is still subject to a finding that they have broken 
the law. The possibility of facing large pay-outs in damages may cause some cartelists to 
think twice before stepping forward. If this indeed proves to be the case, then the drive to 
increase private enforcement may kill off many of the public enforcement cases that such 
actions rely on. It may even go some way to explain the decline in cases we have seen. That 
would represent a significant step backwards in overall enforcement. Only time will tell if 
the Directive has failed to facilitate a significant increase in private enforcement, while 
creating sufficient uncertainty to undermine leniency. 
 
  
 
